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FOREWORD
This "Information Service" has been initiated and established

by the Chief of Naval Personnel for the benefit of officers unable to

attend the Naval War College.

In this and subsequent issues

will be found selected articles of
will be outstanding lec

value to all officers. Many of these articles

tures delivered at the Naval War College and other service

institutions
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SEA POWER IS WORLD POWER
An article by

Commander George H. Miller, U. S. Navy
As the United States stands on the threshold of what may one
day be known as her Golden Age it might be well for us to look back
over the road which has led our country to its present position of

world leadership. Today we are the most powerful nation on earth,

and there is little doubt that much of the credit for this growth can
be laid to our fortunate geographic position. Situated between

two great oceans, the United States is unmistakably a maritime
power. Our forefathers, who crossed the seas to found our na
tion, were seafaring people.

They derived their living from the
sea, and it is because of the sea that our nation grew and pros
pered. The seas have given us security and economic stability,
and these two elements are wholly related, one to the other.

As we grew, we enjoyed the tacit protection of the British
Navy. And it was because of the maternalistic attitude, and pos
sibly the preoccupation, of the British that we were permitted to

use the seas without having to pay our way. In other words we
were given a free ride by the British Navy. For example, we pro
pounded the Monroe Doctrine and were able, by obtaining the sup
port of the British, to make it stick. Later we built a great fleet of

clipper ships without having to bear the expense of a huge navy to

protect them. In World War I, we were able to fight an overseas
war chiefly because the British Fleet was there to run interference
for us.

Between World War I and World War II we were able to
build a tactical navy designed to defeat the Japanese Fleet in a
Commander Miller is a member of the
Naval War College.

Staff of the President,
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fleet action.

During. this period all our talent was devoted to the

problem of defeating the Japanese Fleet in the Pacific, while in

the Atlantic our thinking went very little beyond the Neutrality
Patrol.

As for the rest -of the world, we let the British worry

about that;

So lo:p.g as the British looked out for things else-

where we did not have to think seriously about problems pf maritime
strategy--or global strategy.

Thus our navy was a tactical navy, superbly trained and,

we believed, ready to fight. Fleet training and fleet readiness were
given top priority.

They were our primary· objectives in our peace-

time training for war.

Today we face a different situation..

The British are un

able to carry their former share of the load.

We in the United

States are finding it necessary to assume more and more of the

responsibility for world stability.

And so if anyone is going to

do any serious thinking about the uses and implications of sea
power it must be the United States.

It is because of our unchallenged position as the dominant

sea power that we are today the greatest power on the face of

the earth. It is because of this control of the seas that we are
able to exert our influence in most of the important areas of the

earth. And in case of war sea power places at our disposal most

of the resources, the populations, and the industrial capacity of the
world. We need only look at the Globe to remind ourselves that

wherever the oceans touch the shores, the United States exerts a
powerful influence for world stability. Consequently, so long as

we control the seas, our frontiers, unlike those of a land power, lie
acrqss the seas rather than at our own borders.
Now we are witnessing an amazing paradox.

Here is a na
tion, born and brought up by the sea, a nation which is today one

2
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of the greatest sea powers the world has ever known; and her
people are beginning to forget it. Why has this happened?
One reason for this apparent confusion of thought is the
fact that we are in the midst of an industrial revolution. In the
last hundred years, civilization has advanced further in the techni
cal field than it has in all previous recorded history. We have

moved so fast that our military thinking has not been able to
keep pace with the development of new weapons. We are tend
ing to become so preoccupied with the technical aspects of warfare
that our strategic thinking suffers.
In the midst of this technical advance, we find the British

forced to relinquish their position as the dominant sea power. We
in the Navy were just not ready for the task that was thereby

handed to us. Up to this time, we had always been a tactical
Navy, free to occupy ourselves with our own little problems, while
the British worried about the rest of the world. Fleet training

and fleet readiness have always taken priority over higher education

in naval strategy. As a result, we do not have in our Navy or
in our country today any sizeable group of recognized naval
strategists. We have never really needed these strategic thinkers
until now; and we just do not have them.
We have a wealth of technical experts who have no equal
in any other nation. We have aviation specialists, amphibious
specialists, submarine specialists, anti-submarine specialists, atomic
energy specialists, and electronic specialists, but we just do not have
enough people with a clear understanding of sea power and mari
time strategy. Without such understanding these many elements of
military power cannot be properly integrated into a pattern of
national security.
Along with our rapid technical development there has grown
up among our people a sincere desire to turn from considerations

3
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of national security to the more constructive pursuits of peace.

There has been a natural tendency to look around for a simple

formula by which our national security problems could be solved.

Some have suggested that the simple solution to our problem lies

in the large-scale use of the atomic bomb.

We recognize in this

proposal the theory of the blitzkrieg, the quick, easy victory idea,
that has always seemed so attractive to the uninformed.

It is

the old land-power concept of the "putsch", which depends so
much on being able to obtain the quick surrender of the enemy.

But if the enemy fails to surrender according to plan, the blitz

krieg fails, and the attacker is faced with a totally different kind of

a war, a kind for which he is not prepared. He finds himself fight

ing the kind of war the enemy wants to fight, and the result in
this case could very well be final defeat.

And thus today we are attempting to solve our national se,.

curity problems through poorly conceived concepts, rather than
through a clear understanding of geography and strategy.

We as

a nation are attempting to ignore the very existence of three

quarters of the surface of the earth-the seas, by which we have

grown to our present position of world power.

The truth of the matter is that we in the Armed Forces have

stood by while these unsound concepts were being pressed.

We

simply did not have the people who understood the significance

J

of the seas to our national life well enough to spell it out for the
American people.

We can go even one step further.

In some instances, we in

l'l

the Navy have helped promote these false concepts. During the con

fusion that followed the initial use of atomic weapons, there were
those in our own service who came forward to assert that from now

on wars would be fought exclusively below the surface of the seas,

or in the skies.

And there was one of our wartime captains who is

4
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reputed to have said, "I am retiring because there is no longer
any need for a navy."

As a result of our failure to keep our thinking abreast of

new developments the American people are beginning to lose sight

of the vital significance of the sea areas of the world to their na

tional security and prosperity. There is a growing tendency to turn

from the sea and to accept the far more costly security measures
peculiar to land powers.

Some current concepts, instead of wel

coming and exploiting to the fullest the free, easy road of the sea,
seek to avoid its use.

Yet, by the very facts of geography we are
a maritime power. To reach the rest of the world in peace or in
war, we must first cross the seas; for others to reach us they, too,
must first cross the seas.

In peace and in war the maritime power holds a tremendous

•

-

economic advantage over the land power.

The significant phen

and float it on the surface of the water;

It floats by itself; it

omenon of sea power is that we can build a huge tub, or hull,
requires no power to keep it afloat.

This huge tub can be filled

with cargo-or bombs, or airplanes, or soldiers-and with relatively

little power can be moved to almost any point on the surface of the

earth.

There are no rail or road beds to maintain, no mountains to

cross, no tunnels to dig. And as our civilization continues to de

velop more ways will be found to use this cheap, easy road of the
sea.

Water transportation is by far the most economical means
By conservative estimate it is

of transportation known to Man.

two times as economical as land transportation and thirty-four times
as economical as air transportation. To take a specific example,

one oil company estimates that it costs twenty times as much to
transport petroleum products by rail as it does by water. Thus the

cost of transporting petroleum products by air would be over three

...
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hundred times the cost by water. When we realize that our overseas
transportation during five years of the past war amounted to ap

proximately 676 billion ton-miles and that about two thirds of this
total consisted of petroleum products we can readily see the eco

nomic advantage of gearing our war and peacetime transportation
to the sea.

War is fundamentally a problem of transportation, the prob
lem of transporting weapons-whether they be in the form of

bombs, projectiles or bayonets-to the point where they will exert

the greatest influence on the enemy. It would therefore seem pru

dent that we plan, in the event of war, to transport our weapons

as close as possible to our objective by sea, shifting to more expen

sive means of transportation only when sufficient resistance de
velops to prevent further movement by water.

air

By projecting our

forces and ground forces at the end of sea lines of communica

tion a smaller percentage of the national wealth is expended for

transportation.

For every dollar expended for our military estab

lishment we would thereby assure ourselves of more hitting power
at the point of contact with the enemy.

In order to assure our

selves of the tremendous advantages inherent in water transporta

tion it therefore seems reasonable that our primary

national

jective in peace or in war is to maintain control of the seas.

ob

Any

threat to this control should be considered as the major threat to
our national security.

What steps are we taking to clarify our thinking on the

subject of sea power?

Even today there are few in our Navy, or

in the country at large, who see the critical need for a serious

study of sea power and naval strategy.

There are few who real-

. ize that a basic understanding of sea power is a matter of grave
concern to every citizen of the United States. For the day we as a
nation relinquish our supremacy on the seas is the day we begin
our decline.

6
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Today there are relatively fe:w in the Navy who fully un
derstand the implications of sea power. Before we can carry this
message to the other services and to the people of the United
States we must first educate ourselves. Unless the study of sea
power is pursued vigorously and continuously with the best minds
available in the country we cannot expect to maintain our dominat
ing position in the world. This is a matter of immediate concern
to the people of the United States. The best talent and the best
equipment in the country must be made available to work on the
problem of maintaining our position on the seas.
The study of sea power and naval strategy is an under
taking that should be given the highest priority. It is a project as
urgent as the study and development of anti-submarine warfare,
guided missiles, or atomic energy. Unless our strategic thinking
is the best in the world all the new weapons we are developing can
not save us.
The case for sea power was never so strong as it is today.
It is the single factor governing our present position as a World
Power. The implications of sea power for our future go far beyond
anything we can now comprehend. We in the Navy must be the
first to recognize and understand this fact.
We Americans might also remind ourselves that it is not in
evitable that the United States maintain indefinitely her present
position of world supremacy; we are not immune to decadence. For
even though our scientific progress has been nothing short of re
markable, we are not a race of supermen. Nor are we specially en
dowed with some supernatural immunity from human error. We as
a nation are vulnerable to the same error, the same pitfalls as are
other communities of human beings.
7
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History is filled with the epitaphs of nations which, though

blessed with favorable maritime positions, chose to turn their backs
on the sea. We hold in our own hands the destiny of our country;

and in our minds lay the seeds of our own destruction. The quality
of our strategic thinking today may well deter�ine whether the

life of these United States will be measured in centuries-or in

decades.
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THE ARMED FORCES AND PUBLIC INFOR MATION
IN WAR AND PEACE
A lecture delivered by

Mr. Erwin D. Canham

at the Naval War College
May 6, 1948

It isn't really necessary to take much time to seek to prove
the importance of public information and a sound public informa
tion program. I don't know that we Americans have learned the
significance of public information as quickly or perhaps even as
completely as some of our enemies. A good deal has come to light
in the last decade about public information and its uses-a good
deal that is revealing and very important. As an illustration, the
diary of the notorius Dr. Goebbels, which has quite recently been
published, is filled with revealing tips as to the power of propa
ganda.
I shall seek throughout everything I have to say to make
clear and to emphasize the great and profound difference between
a public relations program in a democracy and one in a dictator
ship. In a democracy one responds to the right of the people to
know certain things, and the attitude is one of opportunity between
the official and the public-while in a dictatorship public informa
tion is used as an unscrupulous and ruthless tool of thought con
trol. The fact that public information can be used as an extremely
powerful weapon of thought control indicates that it is a subject
which can no longer be safely ignored. Since dictatorships have ·
always recognized and used public information as a frankly con
fessed weapon it behooves us to think it out more carefully and see
Mr. Canham is Editor of the "Christian Science Monitor," and Vice
President of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.
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wherein a sound program of public relations is an important as
set and a valuable instrument in attaining definite objectives.
I mentioned Dr. Goebbels and his diary. Dr. Goebbels has
an extreme sensitiveness to words. For example, shortly after
Hitler came to power in Germany Dr. Goebbels saw to it that the
word "assassination" never appeared in the German press. So
fin(;lly drawn was this concept of propaganda and of thought con
trol that Dr. Goebbels, as one of the great experts in the field,
decided that the mere publication of the word "assassination" was
contrary to the Nazi interest.

Perhaps the greatest illustration of the use of public in
formation as a powerful weapon is the illustration of the Soviet
Union today. It is quite obvious that the Russians are afraid of
information; they are afraid of any ideas, any set of facts which
may, to any degree, challenge their approved doctrine. The Iron
Curtain around the Soviet Union is the result and it grows higher
and higher with every passing week.

The fear-inspired efforts
to plug every possible loop-hole in that barrier get more intensive
with every passing week.
I recently spent a month in Geneva in rather arduous ne
gotiations with the Soviet Union and it was perfectly obvious to
me that some of the best talent and most profound study in the
Soviet Union is being devoted to the problem of thought control
in the effort to isolate and insulate the Soviet Union from any
sort of infiltration of ideas from the outside world. You prob-

�

ably know that right now a purge is going on in Moscow-a
purge of all individuals who have had any contact whatsoever
with the West. One by one, individuals who have had some contact with the West are being removed from positions of responsibility. They are being sent somewhere east of the Urals or
to th.e salt mines or some such place where even their slight contact

10
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with the West will not contaminate the remainder of the popula
tion with ideas which may be alien and somewhat challenging
to the approved doS!trine. That purge is going on. Our corres
pondent reports to us of the steady progress of this effort to
weed out everybody who has been in contact with the West.
You may remember that at one time the Red Army took
over a rest hotel in Karlsbad where general officers were per
mitted to go and enjoy the waters. It was decided some months
ago that Karlsbad was too dangerous, too far west, for even a

general officer to sojourn and so the rest hotel at Karlsbad was

closed.

This is just a further indication of the recognition which

is being given to the field of public information. It should
awaken us more fully than ever before to the importance of un
derstanding the potentialities in this field.
This is not a field which Americans take to with any de
gree of satisfaction or ease. I doubt very much if many men in

this room would greatly relish plunging into the task of handling
publicity. I could be wrong, but it is my feeling that we are in
stinctively repelled by the effort to try to control people's thinking.
My major thesis is that we do not have to get into the
position and the attitude of Dr. Goebbels or of any other totalitar
ian manipulator of public thinking; that there is a different basis,
a different formula, and a different concept and relationship which

can be worke<J out in a representative government which can be
maintained and carried through with complete dignity, propriety
and self respect; that this can be carried through in an atmosphere
in which we are never seeking to soften up the other man's thinking
or his right to think, but in which we are responsive to his need to
know the largest possible area of fact, truth, and sound doctrine.
This is of course an age of publicity, not only in the totali11
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It is a brash new world of pub
licity and we have to find out how to live in it. We might as well
conclude that the newspaper, the radio and the P. R. 0., like the
tarian states but in our own.

automobile, are here to stay.

Instead of kicking against any irk

some and irritating attributes of this weapon, we should learn
better how to use it. I assure you that this is a study that will pay

dividends as many have already discovered.

I should like to make it clear, near the outset, that news
paper men, people on our side of the fence so to speak, have a
very great deal to learn. We have to accept new obligations of res
ponsibility in these very troublesome days.

candid newspaper man will recognize it)
ponsibility on the side of the press.

There is (and every

far too much irres

I

We work for the most part

under a considerable handicap, a handicap that goes all the way

back to events which took place in the Garden of Eden.

The

human mind is more interested in conflict, in disaster, in sensa

tion, and in scandal, than in constructive, sound, forward-looking

and sometimes unexciting developments.

For the most part, publicity is built upon conflict and

sensation and for this reason newspapers are more or less in a

constant battle with their better selves.

They are aware of the

ways in which it is possible to cater to this human desire for

sensation and scandal, conflict and disaster.

At the same time

every newspaper editor knows that he has a responsibility to the

people-the responsibility to try to tell the truth.

The acceptance

of this responsibility and the setting of higher standards, I think,
has made some progress within the American press.

However

the fact remains that in conducting public relations activities one

must deal with an activity in which there is a premium on con

flict, revelation of secrets, trash, scandal, and sensation.

It is

important to help newspapers rise above these imperatives which

tend to drag them down.

It is important to help newspapers

12
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carry through the responsibility which they owe to the public, to
the nation, to the well-being of all.
It is also true in many respects and with few exceptions
that newspapers and radios live in abysmal ignorance of the
Armed Forces. This means that the public is almost equally in
such abysmal ignorance.
Ignorance is a constant danger; ignorance is the weapon
of totalitarianism. Iron Curtains are always a greater danger
to the power seeking to hide behind them than they are to anyone
else. I believe Iron Curtains more often hide weakness than
strength. Perhaps some of you can confirm this statement from
personal observation.
About a little over a year ago when I was in Japan, I was
taken by Capt. Decker down to Yokosuka to visit the former Jap
anese naval base there. Captain Decker and other officers made
it very clear to me that the tremendous wall of secrecy which
the Japanese built about that particular spot hid weakness rather
than strength and that the stories which we had heard during the
thirties of vast dreadnaughts and of other great developments
being worked out in the Japanese shipyards were, to a large ex
tent, myths which had been able to come into being, spawn and
flourish behind walls of ignorance. Therefore, obviously, these
Iron Curtains of ignorance are in a sense a greater danger to the
person who is seeking to erect and maintain them than they are
to the rest of us •
Of course it is necessary sometimes, in an emergency, to
hide weakness. Everybody recognizes the necessity for the right
forms of censorship in wartime and for the concealment of mili
tary secrets in peacetime. There is a tendency for censorship
to become habit forming and for information which could break

13
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down public ignorance to be held up long after the need for
secrecy. There have been violations, gross and grave violations,
of what should have been a patriotic obligation not to print. I
think those violations will be fewer and the right relationship will
be maintained if every responsible officer in the armed services is
prepared to weigh the legitimate need for secrecy against the

legitimate need of the public to know. More often than not,
ignorance is the greatest danger of all. Public participation, pub
lic partnership, is a great good in itself. which must . be achieved
in the largest possible degree.·
The armed services are part of the public services of the

nation which means that ·an officer in the armed services is a

public servant and like other public servants he must accept as a

part of his public obligation the duty of giving an account of
himself to the public. This is done through proper channels,
in a proper way and through such media of ultimate expression
as the press, the radio and so on. The more accurately and the

more fully the public understands the goal and the performance

of the armed services, the more whole heartedly will the public
support those services. Particularly in these precarious times,

it is desperately important for the public to understand the
precise role of the armed services. All this means that today,
more than ever before in peacetime, it is necessary for the armed
services to study the duty, the opportunity and the technique of
public relations.
More than once during the recent war, several of these

three qualities were not adequately recognized. We did see an
enormous expansion of technique during the war. Public relations
officers blossomed everywhere but their mere existence is far from
enough. Some of the worst crimes against public information,
some of the greatest damage to the armed services themselves and
to individual officers was done by public relations officers who

14
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misunderstood and misapplied their energies. Conversely, some
of the best public information work was done not by public re
lations officers but by professional officers who had grasped the
duty and opportunity of a public relations program.
We have come a very long way from the exasperated of
' ficer, early in the last war, who once declared at a Washington
cocktail party, speaking of war correspondents, "I wouldn't tell
them anything until the war was over and then I'd tell them
who won." This is a natural enough feeling and one can sym
pathize with it, particularly if one has known some war corres

pondents. Nevertheless strength comes from the people and the
ultimate strength of the Armed Services will rest upon the de
gree of public support. Public relations technique can be stymied

if there is not a recognition, from the top on down, of the duty of
keeping the public informed. ' I wish to quote an eloquent para
graph recognizing this duty and put into excellent words by Lt.

General Collins, now Deputy Chief of Staff. This paragraph
says what I think we all agree on; forgive me if it is covered
in terms of the Army:
"Responsibility of the Army is to make sure that
the public has real information on which to base sound
evaluation of it's Army. The Army has nothing to hide
and nothing to fear if it recognizes the public as a partner,
as well as a boss; if it ignores the captious critic and
assumes that public confidence is there for the making.
But it cannot expect that confidence unless it is deserved.
The individual soldier, commissioned and enlisted, is res
ponsible for seeing that it is deserved. It �s the responsibility of the Commander to see to it that his officers and
men conduct themselves in the manner that will win the
public esteem and that the military establishment has
the high professional standards expected of it by the pub
lic. It is the job of the public relations officer to assist
the Commander .in cementing this partnership with the
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public by providing accurate, full, and unbiased· informa
tion and by interpreting the profession of arms to a nation
which is eager to be proud of its armed srvices."
That is the basic relationship which needs to be understood and
carried out.
I had personal contact with a good deal of public relations
work in the last war and it is my impression that the very best
public relations work was done at the top. I had the opportun
ity during the war of sitting in on informal conferences with
Admiral King and General Marshall. Both of these men did a
superb job of discussing with our group (which was representa
tive of the nation's editors) the state of affairs, the problems

which arose, difficulties and so on. To my knowledge there was
no instance of any violation of their confidence.
The best public refations. work can be done at the top and

the tone can be set which will permeate the entire service. If it
, is continuously recognized that the greatest possible achievement
is to get close· to the people, then the public relations program
will be on a sound basis. I don't know whether it is worthwhile

to go into any post-mortems of some of the public relations work
of the last. war. In preparation for this talk I asked half a dozen
of the members of our staff who were themselves either public
relations officers, several of them in the Navy, or who were war
correspondents, to give me memoranda analyzing the problem as
they had seen it in action during the second World War.
gave me some very hard-hitting and candid answers.

They

They support the point that I have been making, that the
main thing is to get underneath the psychology which would
naturally prefer to fight a war in private. Secrecy is an im

portant part of war. You deal properly here, day in and day
out, with classified documents and information, confidential and
secret material.

In the nature of things you may be more ac-

16
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customed and more indoctrinated with concealing than with re
vealing. That point of view, which is entirely proper and sound,
has to be reconsidered in relationship to the problem of public
'information. You are trained to think accurately, precisely and
scientifically. The average newspaper writer is not necessarily
trained to think in quite that same way. He is trained to in

terest the public. Hence there is not a natural meeting of minds
between men trained as you are and men who are trained as
That gulf has to be bridged. It can be
newspaper men.
bridged if it is realized that along side this duty of secrecy,'
which should never be breached, is the positive advantage of

letting the public know everything that it can know safely. The
advantage of an informed public has to be weighed against the

precaution taken by not giving out information. It is a little bit
like the relationship of sins of commission and omission. There
is a natural inhibition against letting information out unless there
is some positive reason for it or unless the information is perfect

,ly innocuous. That attitude must be studied and re.;.examined in
the light of the importance of an informed public.
There was a revolution in public relations during the last

Our men who were both public relations officers and war
correspondents agree that in late '44 and '45 the expansion of

war.

public relations in the Pacific was on the whole a very healthy
and important decision. The gratitude of the press to the men
who were responsible for that expansion and revolution in policy
is great. It was, however, an uphill job.

I want to outline the elements of a constructive public re
lations program. First, establish a general concept, from the
Naval Academy on up, that it is important for the public to un
,derstand that information is a precious asset to be used con
structively and advantageously.

It is important to have the at.;.
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titude, not of constant desire to hold everything back, but of
responsiveness to the opportunity of public relations which pro
duces an instinctively right public relations program. We have
to get back to fundamental thinking in a responsible government
and to realize that the support of the public is, as I have said
so often, the most precious and valuable asset that can be had.
The second element is to establish clearly the distinction
between information and propaganda. I think one of the worst
curses which ran through our public relations program, particular
ly during the war, was a sort of shame-faced feeling on the
part of responsible officers that they were really being called
upon to become propagandists and they didn't like being propa
gandists. This instinctive American abhorrence for propaganda,
and an out-and-out dislike for the word is sound and right. No
one should be called upon to become a propagandist and no one en
gaged in public relations work should shoulder the inferiority
complex of thinking that he is a propagandist. There doesn't have
to be any propaganda to it. The problem is simply one of an open
channel of information between the services and the people. I
think the curse, the feeling that one is a propagandist, came into
being especially when adverse and disagreeable news had to be
handled. That need not be the case at all. Responsiveness is the
keynote. A relationship, a bond, a link, a channel, between the
services and the public is the keynote. Responsibility, not pro
motion or propaganda is the basic word.
Don't worry too much about adverse publicity on stories
which are technically incorrect or seem to be undesirable. It
wouldn't do much harm if officers who are forced in this mael
strom of public relations could get some of the psychological at
titude of the politician. The successful politician, as you all know,
has a hide as thick as an elephant and only starts worrying when
18
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he doesn't get into the headlines. An adverse headline is regard
ed as just as much of an asset as a favorable headline. The im
portant thing is that the politician has to be talked about, to be
in the news-not forgotten. You remember the advertising cam
paign which went on for a good many years warning people of
the horrors of pink tooth-brush. The campaign was finally
abandoned partly because so many people kept going into drug
stores and asking to buy a pink toothbrush.
This really proves the point that confused public concepts
do build up but in spite of this it is important to have the public
aware of the Navy and of its basic problems. The public will not
always be as wrong as the pink toothbrush people were. I have,
and I think probably you all have, a rather profound belief in the
fact that public opinion balances up; that while any number of in
dividuals may be wrong, there is a certain fundamental righ�ness
in the general will and in the general direction of the popular opin
ion when at least a minimum of information gets to the people.
So I say it is important not to be too sensitive, too meticulous, or too
fussy about the things one gets into in this public relations business,
but emulate the hard-boiled old politicians. I have never heard
Mayor Curley of Boston complain although nine-tenths of his pub
licity in the last 25 years has been seemingly adverse. The old
scoundrel knows that any publicity has a certain value. This is
a pretty cynical view I know, gentlemen, but you are up against
a profession which has to deal with popularization.
It is necessary to study the techniques ()f public relations
and to be in touch with experts in the profession as the situation
requires. There is a wide diversity of opinion as to the techniques
of public relations. It is not a scientific professon with every
thing worked out on a slide rule basis but at the same time
there are experts. Newspaper men are not, by any means, always
19
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the best experts in the field; there is a difference between the
role of the reporter and the role of the public relations officer.
One of the most successful public relations officers in the service

of the American government, Mike McDermott, of the State De
partment, has been at the business for over a quarter century.
He was never a newspaper man. As a matter of fact, Mike start
ed out as a stenographer and began to absorb, by some kind of
osmosis, the necessary relationship between the press and the gov
ernment service.

As I said, many other newspaper reporters who have tried
to do the same thing have failed because of the difference be
tween the public relations relationship and the reporter's relation
ship with the press. However, there is a technique and it is being

studied and developed to a degree. Progress fa being made in re

ducing this to terms which may be studied and comprehended by
people coming in from the outside.

But this technique is tremendously subordimrte to attitudes.
One basic attitude is the value of maintaining contacts, of getting
close to newspaper men and keeping close to them. I emphasize

that it is valuable to maintain this contact at the highest level pos
sible and to add plenty of follow-through at lower levels. If you

·do have contact with the newspaper men, friendships and relation

ships, social and informal contacts, then I think you will begin to
understand more clearly the viewpoint of the newspaper man. You

will understand that his job is the task of popularizing things, of
getting into people's thinking, and you may soften up some of your
quite natural indignation at the over-simplification of problems. It
is a very difficult thing to convert a technical subject to terms the
public can readily understand. There are bound to be errors, lack
of precise and explicit qualifying remarks, in every popularized
account but it is a problem we cannot get around and have to
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accept. A lot of this publicity will be repulsive to the expert but,
nevertheless, it does serve a useful purpose in getting through to
public thinking.
I strongly recommend the habit of press conferences when
ever there is any need and opportunity. It is even possible to come
to enjoy press conferences after a certain amount of experience
with them.
I have already referred to the importance of understanding
the viewpoint of newspapers. Newspapers cannot escape the ob
ligation of popularizing material, the duty of holding public in
terest. This need for popularizing is terribly overdone and abused
but we are dealing with the people who will decide the pattern of
national defense in the United States. We must inform and edu
cate them. We cannot ignore them; we cannot permit them to
remain in the shadow of ignorance which has frequently surround
ed them. This goes pretty deep. The difference between our
selves and our enemies in this world is probably best. defined as
the differnce between a nation which respects the individual as the
most important element and value within the nation and one which
declares the individual to be valueless and the state to be all im
portant and all powerful.
The only way totalitarian states can maintain their hold on
the people, can make their force actually operative, is to control,
to destroy the independent thinking of their people. By allo�
ing public expression there is bound to be conflict and diversity
of thinking. This was the primary issue at. our conference on
Freedom of Information at Geneva. The great cleavage between
the Ea.stern Bloc and ourselves was this: they believe in one single
set of ideas, imposed by force, which is infiltrated into the people's
thinking by artful devices, subtle techniques and ruthless re
pressions----in short, by complete thought control; while to us
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· strength comes from diversity and a belief that all progress comes
from the conflict of ideas.
This basic principle of diversity, of conflict, of growth
through the stress or strain of ideas meeting in healthy conflict,
we believe will produce strength. I think that by taking a long
historic viewpoint the germs of weakness contained within the
totalitarian system are those which have wiped out genuine self

criticism; whereas with us, self-criticism and conflict of ideas pro
duce a healthy organism which goes forward, revises its ideas, im
proves its ideas, and carries them ahead.
The relationship of that principle with the press is this:

You will encounter a diversity in publications and a diversity of

treatments in the press.

It will be apparent that the viewpoint

and technique of one newspaper w.ill be very different from an

other, but if you appreciate that the vagaries, the irresponsibilities,

the over-simplifications of the press go back to the· idea of free
and diverse opinions, you will be more tolerant and will se.e that any
effort to generalize or to standardize the· press will be a technique
pointed in the totalitarian direction and would lead us away from

-our greatest source of strength which is our cantankerousness and
our unwillingness to accept standardized concepts. I am deeply
confident that techniques of study and of working out problems

here, as in every other well conducted American institution, will be
based on constant reexamination of ideas. That is part and parcel
of our public information system.

Freedom of the American press depends upon diversity.

Your relationship to the press will depend upon the recognition
of its importance to the public and of its value to you. There
is no chance of a meeting of minds between the East and the West
on so fundamental a matter of principle as this matter of public
information, but we in the West must not be victims to totalitar-

22
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss3/1

26

Naval War College: March 1949 Full Issue

RESTRICTED

ian thinking to such an extent that we will deny the people the

diversity of information which will enable them to go forward,

which will enable them constantly to reexamine, to criticize and

to grow strong through self-examination and self-criticism.

In two. wars, the two greatest and most tragic wars of his

tory, the United States Navy was headed by newspaper publishers
Secretary Daniels 'and Secretary Knox.

After the First World

War the Navy became involved in the most extensive disarmament

program in our national experience. After the Second World War

the Navy ran into an economy wave which had for a time very

grave consequences.

These two experiences would seem to indi

cate that there is still a very large unsolved problem about the pub

lic's information concerning its armed services despite enormous

efforts and real progress.

It is fair to conclude that that prob

lem has not yet been adequately solved.

I repeat, take seriously

the opportunity of getting closer to the public through the media of

public information. I believe that every officer should be conscious
of the significance of this task, not as an onerous chore, not as an

undignified and unworthy type of dissemination of propaganda,

put rather as an enormous opportunity to be responsive to the need
and the right of people to know everything which will not be a
positive danger.

Now as I said before, I think you have to work primarily

against a viewpoint which rightly and almost instinctively holds
that it is safer not to talk too much.

One has to be aware and

conscious at all times that along side of this important obligation

must go the requirement to do a better job of breaking down the
barriers of ignorance by giving the American people more informa

tion with which to grow through conflict and diversity, criticism
and reexamination; to grow into an appreciation of the world res
ponsibilities which have become ours.

This relationship of pub-
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lie information to the future of peace or war in the world is sim
ple to understand. It is simple but the people of the United
States must understand the importance of a strong national de
fense of arms adequate to maintain our duty and obligation in this
storm-tossed world. Unless the American people do adequately
understand these necessities the dangers of war are doubled and

If the American people do understand the necessity of
strength at this time, if instead of some vague and ignorant concept
based largely on fear they understand that our rearmament pro
trebled.

gram of today is not a war program but a peace program, then, in
deed, there is a possibility of maintaining peace in the world.
At Geneva in our small way we ran the gamut of relation
ships with the Eastern Bloc. American diplomacy since the war
has not been very shrewd or successful in its relationship with the
Eastern Bloc but certain fundamentals had managed to seep

through. As we pr�pared our tactics for the Geneva conference
we decided that the basic thing was to take a very strong, almost a

provocative, position at the outset, to maintain it throughout and
to get the jump on every single point where we could get our pro
posals, our ideas and our policies in first. The chief American

delegate at the opening session of that conference made an ex
tremely strong and provocative speech which completely changed
the tone of the conference. The Russians immediately turned con
ciliatory, placating and appeasing. They sought to weedle around
the middle group nations to support an appeasing attitude. Every
time we came in strong the air cleared, and the Eastern delegates
had to appeal for some form of conciliation, some form of com
promise. We maintained to the end a refusal to compromise, say
ing it was impossible to compromise in a field of basic principles.
Now that teaches us a lesson that the American people
ought to understand. The American people are being appealed to
today by various individuals who know that the American people
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want peace. •It is perfectly obvious that the American people want
peace but not at any price. We want to insure peace but our ex
perience at Geneva proved to us again that the way to insure peace
is through strength, vigor and capacity; to lay down a position
and to maintain it.

The American people have not altogther understood that. To
people a rearmament program sometimes seems a
American
the
war-like program.

I believe that the undeviating informational

line of the armed services should be : that our rearmament program

is a peace program, not a war prog�am; that it is the only basis

on which we can hope, at this stage of human and world experi

ence, to insure peace; that the sacrifice and expenditures which

the American people are being called upon to make are not expendi

tures in the interests of war but rather expenditures in the interests

of preserving the peace and that the program of appeasement which
Mr, Henry Wallace, for example, is presenting to the American

people and to which he is getting a response, is due to the basic

craving of the American people to avoid a Third World War, a

craving which is perfectly sound and right but based upon ig
norance.

The whole problem of peace comes down to this problem
· of dispelling fears by letting the American public see that the

necessity for supp<;>rting a rearmament program is not because

we are afraid of the Russians or of anyone else, but because it is
the way to achieve peace at this time. Public int�rest on this sub

ject will not be dispelled through silence but will be dispelled
through a responsive attitude toward the need of the public to
know everything that it possibly can. If any chances are taken
they must be taken on the side of knowledge rather than on the
side of ignorance.
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I believe that this opportunity can be seized and that we do
have a chance to achieve a stable world. It is a necessity to carry
through this kind of information program if the armed forces are
to preserve their rightful place as pillars in the temple of peace.
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ECONOMIC WARFARE - THE DEFENSE
A lecture delivered by

Prof. Charles Cortez Abbott
at the Naval War College
November 9, 1948

My subject this morning is Economic· Warfare-The De
fense. In particular I �hall address myself to problems concern
ing the defense of the United States and her allies-actual or po
tential-in the present "cold war" and in the event hostilities
break out between this country and Russia.

There appear to be three distinct aspects of this subject
that merit attention. In the first place, there is the protection, in
a physical sense, of the United States and her allies and of the areas
from which they draw essential war materials. In other words,
economic defense of the United States must include defense of more

than the territories within our natural boundaries. There are geo

graphical areas important to us in the light of political and economic
considerations which from the point of view of national interest

must be defended. In the second place, there is the maintenance
and defense of the high level economy which the United States
has maintained since V-J day. The protection of this condition is
necessary, partly for strictly military reasons and partly because

American prosperity is of great political consequence throughout
the world. In the third place, there is the ideological conflict. There
will not be time to say much about this aspect of the problem this
morning. I would, however, like to say at this. point that under
present conditions economic warfare is not simply a "battle for sup
plies," as it was in World Wars I and II. It is also a struggle of
Professor Abbott is Professor of Business Economics at Harvard
University. His lecture entitled "Economic Warfare-The Attack"
appeared in the February issue of "Information Service."
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ideas, of achievements, of two opposed economic systems. In this
ideological struggle, propaganda, which has always been a recog
nized part of economic warfare, will probably play a larger part

than it did in the Second World War.

Since in my lecture a year ago I spoke in some detail regard�
ing the problem of protecting a high level economy, most of my
attention this morning will be devoted to the first aspect of that
problem-the protection of the United States and her allies,. and
particularly of the areas from which they draw supplies.
Before examining particular facets of the problem it may
be helpful if I give some of the background of my thinking on this
whole general subject. It would appear that in the event of hos

tilities many of our actual needs, political and economic, may not
be greatly different from the needs of the Second World War, but

the measures needed to satisfy them I presume might differ ap
preciably.
As regards supplies, it seems likely that the types and per
haps the amounts of strategic and critical materials which we might
need would not be greatly dissimilar to our requirements in the last

war, although I would hope that the Emergency Shipping Priority

List might be trimmed somewhat. One very interesting estimate
that has come to my attention since my last talk, which was based
on the resources available in areas one might expect would be
controlled respectively by the United States and by the U. S. S. R.,
suggests that our chief shortages in the event of hostilities would
be mercury, bauxite, manganese, and oil. I may add that this same
estimate indicated that the chief shortages of the Soviets would
likely be nickel, tin, copper and lead, tungsten, and of course, oil.
Satisfaction of our needs will of course require the control
of the sea lanes. While sea power might not be as useful for the
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blockade of Russia as it was for Germany, it nevertheless would be
of the highest importance-in order to assure this country and
allied areas of a steady flow of supplies, in order to support ad
vance bases from which attacks against Russia might be mounted,
such as British East Africa and Cyprus, and in order to restrict
the movement of enemy agents and of persons capable of induc
ing subversive movements. I make this last point in full recog
nition of the fact that the development of the airplane and the sub
marine has made restrictions of the movements of enemy agents
far more difficult than formerly.
In the last war the phrase "Western Hemisphere Defense"
was one of the common cliches. It has been suggested that in the
event of hostilities we would probably have to add "Security of
the North Atlantic Community" to this former objective, and I
presume, the economic and military defense of other areas as
well. Certainly the maintenance of relative economic stability in
Latin America would be essential, partly because of physical prox
imity, �artly because of the essential foods and raw materials
which we would need to draw from that area. None of these pur
poses, you will observe, can be attained without control of the sea
lanes.
As before, there will probably be a price attached to main
tenance of economic and political stability in the areas important
to us. In its simplest and perhaps its easiest form this price may be
merely the extension of various- kinds of dollar loans . and credits.
It is more likely, however, that the price will consist of things
that these areas will want from us: shipping f:!pace, scarce materials,
manufactured goods, and so on. It seems to me altogether prob
able that the servicing by us of some so-called minimum standard
of economic and business needs will be the price-if not of friend
ship, at least of political and economic conditions that serve our in
terest. Iceland presumably will want hay, fertilizer, agrfoutural
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machinery, and manufactured goods; the East Coast of South

America will want newsprint, coal, and steel; South Africa will

want railroad cars and mining machinery, as well as silk stockings,

toilet paper, and dry cereals; Canada will want fats and oils, es

pecially peanut butter.

To push this thinking one step further,

I would guess that Canada might ask not only for supplies but also

for the maintenance in Latin America of outlets for her pulp,
newsprint, and other products.

I can readily conceive that the price of stability in certain

colonial areas may be the purchase of entire crops or outputs of

raw materials, conceivably even at premium prices. Some of these

commodities may be needed in their entirety, but it is not realistic
to think that we will be so lucky actually as to want all of them.

In the last war the loss of the European market made the entire

copper output of South America available to us and, as you know,
it was bought here.

The Metals Reserves Corporation alone in the

four years ending Novembr 1, 1944, bought $400,000,000 of South

American copper.

Fortunately we needed this item, and it was

available to us .. Maintenance of the Chilean economy, however, in
a style somewhat better than that to which it was accustomed, was
a fortunate by-product.

I can readily conceive of this situation

being reversed, so that the maintenance of the Chilean, or the
South African, or the East African economy through commodity

purchases might become the prime objective, and the acquisition
of commodities a somewhat embarrassing by-product of the policy.

The ability of our adversaries to frustrate these objectives

will certainly be of a. somewhat different character and may be of

somewhat larger dimensions than was the case in the Second World

War.

The mechanisms of economic penetration at the service of

the Russians, which they are using and will use, are quite dissim-

ilar to those of the Nazis.

There will not, presumably, be the prob-

lem of enemy-owned business concerns and trade connectio:ns, at
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least not on the same scale. There is no' Russian counterpart to the
I. G. Farbenindustrie. The problem of hidden or "cloaked" en
emy assets will be of much smaller p�oportions. On the other hand,
it is doubtful if the Nazis ever commanded a fifth column of the pro
portions of the Communist party and its sympathizers; the problem

of loyalty, with its many ramifications, will be far more severe.
In terms of the specific measures of economic warfare and penetra
tion with which we shall have to contend, it is probably safe to
assume that the amount of competitive buying of scarce materials

in neutral markets will be reduced. While it may be ventured
that the Russians have an adequate supply of gold to use as a means

of payment in competitive buying, I would assume that they might
be severely handicapped through lack of an effective world-wide

network of trade connections. As far as I can determine, a system

of trading relations and established commercial connections are
almost if not quite as important for competitive or preclusive
buying as is an adequate supply of the means for payment.
Against this background of thinking we may now consider

in more detail two of the aspects of the problem which I mentioned
at the outset: maintenance of political and economic stability in

areas important to the national interest of the United States,
and preservation of a high level economy in this country.

I shall not try to designate with any precision the areas
which it will be important for us to defend. The forces that
will determine these areas, however, are reasonably clear. There
will be the countries which are our allies; there will be the
interests of military strategy; there will be the areas from which
we have to draw our essential supplies; a,nd particularly there will
be the areas from which our Allies will have to draw their essential
supplies. For example, the Argentine will be of more importance
to Great Britain than to us because of the United Kingdom's de
pendence upon Argentine beef, although this country will no doubt

also need Argentine linseed and quebracho.
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Evidently if we are to receive aid from these areas or give

it to them, control of the means of transportation and communica
tion will be essential. Maintenance of our position will be depend
ent upon supremacy on the sea.

While such control may be of

less offensive significance than in the first two World Wars, its de
fensive significance will be greater and, consequently, the threat
of submarine attack may be of even larger moment.

We can anticipate that economic attacks against our inter

ests in "our" areas will be made.

In general I suspect that the

attacks will not be through what we might call "recognized" in

struments

of economic

warfare-blockade,

trade agreements,

preclusive buying, and so forth-but will be intended to disrupt

the smooth functioning of the productive process and the flow of
trade.

On the whole, it does not appear that Russia will be able to

use effectively the recognized types of economic pressure; but she

has at her disposal other means for accomplishing the same ends.
Let me be more explicit.

In the first two World Wars the United States and the

United Kingdom employed shipping controls and preclusive buy

ing to cut off supplies from Central European powers. A civil
disturbance in South America, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, or
Malaya, sponsored by Moscow, could be used for much the same
purpose-to cut off supplies from the United States or the United

Kingdom.

This country and Great Britain have in the past used
commodity purchase agreements to shape the economy of neutral

and also colonial areas in such a way as to assist our war programs. Our interest at the present time and in the· future will lie
in the maintenance of political stability and a continued production

of necessary materials in these areas. The Russians are quite
capable of various types of operation designed to thwart our in-

terests which is the same as saying that they have methods of
shaping the economic processes in these areas to t:heir purpose.
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Strikes, sabotage, political unrest, inflation, or any other operation
that reduces production or disturbs the normal tenor of business
will serve the Russian .purpose, much as commodity purchase agree
ments have served the purpose of this country and of Great Britain
in the past. I make this point notwithstanding the fact that Rus
sia is using trade agreements with her European satellites much as
if she were a capitalistic power. In the last war we lost control of
Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines through
Japanese conquest. If in these areas Communist or nationalistic
movements sponsored by Moscow should spread, I can conceive that
we might lose their resources almost as fully as if we had lost con
trol of the areas themselves. It does not take great imagination
to see that strikes in key industries and stoppage in key plants
can have much the same effect on production as if those indus
tries and plants were the object of strategic bombing. I was
interested to observe that the November 1st issue of TIME carried
a story to the effect that the coal strike in France was a political
maneuver aimed at hampering the Marshall Plan and European
recovery. The current strike of longshoremen in this country in
itially had the effect of permitting us to supply· Alaska only by an
air lift, and of putting extreme pressure on Hawaii; latterly it
has had the effect of constricting shipments to Western Europe
under the Marshall Plan.
My conclusion may seem far-fetched, but I cannot see why
an effort could not be made through a world-wide movement, partly
Communistic and partly nationalistic, in colonial areas, to cut off
the highly industrialized, raw material importing portions of the
globe from supplies that are produced in those areas. There is
already trouble in greater or lesser degree in Southeast Asia, the
Near East, the Far East, and West Africa. Other parts of the
world, such as North Africa and certain sections of Latin America,
are clearly susceptible to this type of penetration. If such an ef-
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fort were combined with strikes and sabotage in key areas, notably
in docks, harbors, and the maritime industries, it would seem to me

that we might have a reasonable facsimile of a olockade. If, as many
people think, in the next war strategy and operations will neces
sarily be subject to logistics, disturbances in the areas from which
supplies are obtained will come to have a new and a more sinis

ter significance.

While the North American continent is perhaps only mod
erately vulnerable to this type of pressure, it is quite clear that

certain other areas "on our side," notably the United Kingdom
and parts of Western Europe, are distinctly vulnerable. Next to
the coal shortage, probably· the major shortages in Western

Europe and in the low countries are shortages of such imported

items as fertilizers, leather, fibers, fats, and oils. Practically all

of these items are of colonial origin.

It

may seem that I have belabored this point, but I believe

it is of real moment and I wish to give two final examples of what

I mean.

Present plans for European aid assume, I believe, that

by 1951 80 % of Europe's petroleum imports will come from the
Middle East, and that by that date there will be a greatly in

creased volume of European trade across the Iron Curtain.

Clearly the validating of these assumptions depends much more

on Russian action than on ours. It is inconceivable that Russia

could not hamper shipments of petroleum from the Middle East

if she so wished, and certainly the development of east-west trade

in Europe depends directly on her policy.

It follows

of course, that

if these assumptions of the European aid programs are not validated there will be a commensurate increase in the economic

pressure exerted on our economy; at the very least the present
pressure will not be diminished.

The conclusion of this line of thought is that the war po-
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tential of the United States and her allies is most easily attacked
by indirection, and that the area most vulnerable to attack is in the
peripheral sectors of Eurasia and in the colonial territories that
furnish raw material. The kind of attack to be expected, it would
appear, is a combination of measures not ordinarily looked on as
the "orthodox" measures of economic warfare, but which would
have the same purpose and could be highly effective.

To meet this type of attack there are immediately evident
: One is the continuance-or better yet the ex
countermoves
tw<?
tension-of international trade and the present high level of
prosp�rity. The other is stockpiling. I do not intend in this lecture
to try to explore the first of these countermoves, but I do want to
say a little something about stockpiling, and in this term I in

clude offshore stockpiling as well as reserves built up in this
country.
, Stockpiling is of course one of the recognized, classical, or

thodox measures of economic warfare. It is designed to circumvent

the effect of a blockade, or at least to mitigate the effects of a
sudden shortage of essential items. If it is. done on any large
scale it must be done by governmental agencies, partly because
of the amount of money involved (especially if premium prices are
paid), partly because of problems involved in storing and handling,

and partly because utilization of stockpiles must be geared in with
whatever system of allocations and priorities is being employed.

Although the operation must be financed and administered by
government agencies, the operation must be conducted in close
collaboration with industry if it is to be effective.

It may be worth while to quote here some portions of the
"Report on Activities of Metal Reserves Company" for the period
June 28, 1940-November 1, 1944, signed by Charles B. Hender
son, then president of the M. R. C. and chairman of the R. F. C.
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The report covers the period prior to the creation of the United
States Commercial Corporation. According to this report the
M. R. C. contributed to the war effort in four ways:
"It has created stockpiles of metals and minerals that
provide assurance for continued production of military
goods, regardless of possible interruption of supplies."

· "It has assisted in increasing the total volume of metals and
minerals currently flowing into the war effort by making
available to industry, on allocation by the W. P. B., metals
and minerals from sources not available directly to private
industry."
"It has helped to stabilize prices........ by selling at OPA
ceiling prices"-even though it had bought at premium
prices, above OPA ceilings or levels we might consider
"economic."

"It has contributed to the war program by reducing the
strength of the foe through its purchases of supplies
from sources available to unfriendly (later enemy)
powers."
As you know, the M. R. C. was originally set up to stock
pile two commodities, tin and manganese; in the four years of its

operation the list increased to 49. Its transactions covered 51
foreign countries, 31 states of the Union, Alaska, and the Phil

ippines. In addition to buying commodities it paid subsidies to
marginal producers who were thereby enabled to produce and sell
in the ordinary channels of trade at OPA ceiling prices. It set
up subsidiary corporations to operate DPC facilities designed to
produce scarce items. While a substantial number of the stock
pile goals were met 100 % or more, a good many goals were not
attained. Achievement of the goal, of course, does not tell the
whole story of the operation, since sales were continually made
from stockpiles during the period when they were being built up.
I may observe here that some of the audits required of
government corporations under the Corporation Control Act of
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If we are to take these

audits at face value, the stockpiling operation, so far as its book
keeping was concerned, certainly left something to be desired.
If such operations in the future are carried on on a large scale,

here is surely one area where there is considerable room for im-

,·�rovement.

The conclusion that I reach concerning stockpiling is that

a limited amount, designed· to prevent a sudden interruption

in supplies, may be very useful.

But if events develop· in such

a way that more than a moderate stockpile program is urged, or

if substantial reliance is placed on this type of operation, such

circumstances indicate that the economic war under either hot
or cold conditions, is being lost.

Let me turn to the second aspect of the problem which I

mentioned at the beginning of this lecture, the defense of a high
level economy.

In my talk a year ago I took the line. that the

present high level economy in the United States-with its record

breaking national income, its "over-employment," its high tax

receipts, and its large profits-was a fact of great political and

economic consequence throughout the world.

For three years we

have had a most successful economy, more successful than any

one could have hoped for in 1945 and certainly more successful

than the best expectations of many of the "planners"· who fore

cast much lower levels of production and employment.

Except

for price stability we have met all the tests of a successful econ

omy given in the textbooks; we have had full employment and

something more, record-breaking levels of production, a declin
ing debt and burden of taxation, a high level of profits, ail in

creasing volume of capital in".'estment, and a rising standard of

living.

It is this high level economy which makes possible support of
a $40 billion budget and a $250 billion debt, together with the
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enormous "unrequited" exports of which shipments under the
Marshall Plan are only a part. As you know, "unrequited" is
the economists way of describing exports for which you are not
paid. This high level economy has demonstrated to the world the
volume of production possible under a free market economy, avail
able either for armament purposes or for raising the standard of
living of the population. In our "positional war" with the Soviets
this achievement has been something that the Russians undoubt
edly had not counted on.
Unfortunately, a high level economy is a vulnerable econ
omy. It is vulnerable either to a recession or to a final burst of
inflation and speculation that makes a recession inevitable and
more severe than might otherwise be the case. The Russians have
confidently expected and predicted a recession. Should that occur
it would weaken our tax base and our ability to supply raw ma
terials, food, and capital equipment to Europe. It would seriously
compromise the position of the United States on the international
stage, since it would validate the Marxian prophecies.
The Russians could-as could any state with sufficient re
sources and particularly an authoritarian state-undertake from
the outside measures to precipitate either a bust or the final states
of a boom that precede a bust. In my lecture a year ago I
mentioned certain maneuvers that could be undertaken for this
kind of purpose, such as the disorganization of markets for in
ternational commodities, the use of gold shipments for political
purposes, and the falsification or misinterpretation of government
statistics.
The greatest danger, however, I believe lies in the pressures
that can be exerted from the outside in this country on the fed
eral budget, with the consequent repercussions on taxation, spend
ing, and borrowing. I am so thoroughly convinced that the greatest
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danger of overstraining the American economy lies here, in the
problem of the big budget, that I vyill not even stop to argue the
case. The methods available to the U.S. S. R. for exerting pressures
in the field of "big government" and "big spending," both in foreign
and domestic fields, are numerous. The implications of these
. pressures are almost· infinite and extend far beyond the limits of
this lecture. They involve not only the whole field of public finance
and fiscal policy, but also a detailed consideration of how our econ
omy works-down to, say, the adequacy of depreciation policies
of individual companies.
I will make only two observations as regards this type of
pressure. Insofar as Russia, in what we may call the area of
"foreign spending", can increase t�e needs for such things as
ERP or European rearmament through political tensions, dis
ruption of trade, diminution of production, or civil disturbance,
the pressure on our economy is increased. This fact is now be
coming generally recognized. On November 4, Edson Smith, the
financial editor of the Boston Herald said: "It is becoming in
creasingly apparent that whether by accident or design the Russian
government is forcing us into a spending program which makes
the achievement of a stable economy at home practically impos
sible." The implications of such a situation, as I have indicated,
are extremely serious.
"The area of domestic spending'' seems to me to fall natur
ally in the orbit of ideological warfare. Insofar as a public opin
ion can be created which demands and expects big government
spending for social security, farm parity prices, grants and aids, '
and so forth, the pressure on our economy will evidently be in
creased. That is, the problem of the "big domestic budget" is es
sentially one of domestic public opinion. If the public wants a
large volume of spending there will be a large budget; if the pub-
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lie does not want such spending the budget . will be small.. The
point of this line of argument, of course, is that public opinion
in a foreign country is exactly what ideological warfare seeks to
influence.
In conclusion let me say that the framework, the setting,
the logics, and the position of economic warfare in the present .
cold war between the United States and the Russians are quite
different from the situation prevailing in either of the first two
World Wars. This is what might be expected on a priori grounds.
The whole geography of the situation is different and it seems
virtually impossible to blockade the Russians.· The U. S. S. R. is
not so highly industrialized a country as Germany and not so
susceptible to shortages of food and raw materials. Nor is it so
dependent on foreign commercial connections and foreign trade.
Consequently it is distinctly less susceptible to offensive measures
of economic warfare, at least of the traditional type, than was
Germany. On the other hand, in view of our logistic and ideological
position, we are more susceptible to offensive measures of economic
warfare than we were heretofore. We are particularly vulnerable
to types of operations that lend themselves to the Russians' abil
ities. This country, at least this country together with her allies,
is very dependent on an even flow of supplies. Our national in
terest lies in the preservation of "normal" economic activity and
economic and political stability. Our interest in such stability is
more intense and will extend over a wider area than was the case
before. As an industrialized, highly integrated, capitalistic na
tion with a delicate and delicately balanced economy, we are
particularly susceptible to the effects of strikes, sabotage, civil
disturbance in colonial areas. Some of these areas are no further
away than Latin America. Ideological warfare evidently has played
and will play a larger part in the situation than it has before. Con
sequently it seems ncessary that more of our efforts should be, and

�I
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will be, spent on defensive operations than on offensive operations
designed to injure the Russian war potential directly. The Mar
shall Plan is a case in point.
Lest this should seem a pessimistic, unaggressive point of
view, I may point out that few things can be so damaging to the
Russian program, or at least large portions of it, as a failure on

their part, because of the excellence of our economic defense, to ac

complish the world wide proletarian revolution they have so con
fidently predicted. They are in the position of having to validate
.a prophecy. If the prophecy is not validated their ideological
position is not likely to stand the disappointment.
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